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Abstract
To address the impact of regulation on ethical concerns of consumers, we study
the example of minimum wages. In our experimental market, consumers have monop-
sony power, rms set prices and wages, and workers are passive recipients of a wage
payment. We nd that the consumers exhibit considerable fairness towards the work-
ers by buying from the rm with the higher price and the higher wage. We also
nd that consumers have a tendency to split their demand equally between rms,
which is a simple strategy to provide both workers with a minimal payo¤. Introduc-
ing a minimum wage in a mature market raises average wages despite its signicant
crowding-out e¤ects on consumers fairness concerns. Abolishing a minimum wage
crowds in consumers fairness concerns, but crowding in is not su¢ cient to avoid
overall negative e¤ects on the workerswages.
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1 Introduction
In the last decades, rm policy with regard to worker protection, climate change, or related
issues of ethical relevance has received a lot of attention from the public. Firms can prot
from fair behavior towards their workers or from environment-friendly production technolo-
gies if a su¢ cient number of consumers is willing to pay a higher price for its products than
for products of other rms. Acting according to the consumersviews of proper conduct
allows a rm to gain a reputation for being ethical. Thus, it is possible that ethical behavior
survives in a market environment. However, this depends crucially on the preferences of
consumers.
The consumerswillingness to pay for ethical behavior of rms expresses itself not only
in choosing to buy from rms that satisfy higher standards at higher prices, but also in
agreeing to legal regulations that are likely to result in higher prices. Freeman (1996), for
example, reports on an ABC/Washington Post poll from 1989 which posed two questions
to the public. First, it asked whether the respondents salary or the salary of someone in
the immediate family would go up if the government increased the federal minimum wage
in the US. Responses were as follows: Only in 8% of the cases the chief wage earners salary
would go up, in 12% of the cases the salary of someone else in the family would go up,
and in 79% the salary of no-one in the family would go up. The same respondents were
then asked whether they would still favor raising the minimum wage if business passed the
increased salary costs on to the consumers through higher prices. To this question, 82%
answered with yes while only 16% said no. The fact that the vast majority of consumers
accepts higher prices because of a raise in the minimum wage is striking as it suggests
substantial willingness to pay for fair treatment of third parties. On the other hand, this
was a hypothetical question, and it might well be that words are not followed by deeds. We
use an experiment with real monetary incentives to study consumerswillingness to pay for
fair rm conduct in a controlled environment.
The main issue addressed by our experiment is how regulation interacts with fairness of
the consumers in a context where consumers may have to pay higher prices to be fair
towards workers. Often governments want to ensure certain standards of behavior by
legal regulation, such as a minimum wage. But consumers themselves may be willing
to pay higher prices if they know that the rm pays its workers a fair wage. The e¤ects of
government intervention on consumer behavior can be ambiguous. Apart from the direct
e¤ect of the regulation, e.g. forcing rms to pay a certain minimum wage, indirect e¤ects
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can play a role if consumerspreferences are not purely selsh. On the one hand, a minimum
wage might undermine the reputation gain of a rm from paying workers a fair wage (above
the minimum wage) and as a result lead to lower wages. Also, if consumers are willing to
pay for a fair treatment of workers, a minimum wage can crowd out such fair behavior
by consumers. On the other hand, a minimum wage might be interpreted by consumers
as an indication that market wages are too low. If that is the case and in particular if
the minimum wage is low, consumers will pay more attention to wages paid by rms and
possibly condition their purchase decision on them.
In the experiment, we use a simple setup to study the relationship between fairness
and regulation. Consumers have monopsony power in a duopoly market. Workers have
no bargaining power as they have no decision to take. They are employed by a rm and
can neither be red nor quit themselves. Their only source of income is the wage. The
consumer is informed about the prices and wages of both rms. He can then decide which
rm to buy from, and he can also split his demand between rms. This gives the consumer
the power to enforce higher wages by buying from the rm with the higher wage.
Our four treatments serve to investigate the e¤ects of the introduction and abolishment
of two di¤erent minimum wages. In two treatments, there is no minimum wage initially,
but it is introduced after the rst half of the experiment. These treatments di¤er only
with regard to the level of the minimum wage. In the other two treatments, there is a
minimum wage at the beginning, but it is abolished after the rst half of the experiment,
again for both minimum wage levels. This allows us to study the e¤ect of a minimum wage
at di¤erent stages of experience in a market, and the e¤ect of changes in the minimum wage
policy for di¤erent levels of the minimum wage.
We observe two distinct strategies of fair consumers in all treatments. First, consumers
often split purchases equally between rms even when prices di¤er. Second, they sometimes
buy more or even all units at the more expensive rm that also pays a higher wage.
Regarding the policy e¤ects, we nd that the introduction of a minimum wage leads to
a signicant increase in the workersrents. In contrast, abolishing a minimum wage always
a¤ects workers negatively. Furthermore, we nd that consumers exhibit a considerable
willingness to pay for a better treatment of workers as suggested in the poll quoted by
Freeman (1996), but we also nd that this is a¤ected in important ways by the minimum
wage policy. Consumers adjust their behavior to changes in the minimum wage regime.
Importantly, these adjustments are larger than what can be explained by the changes in
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prices and wages. In particular, the consumerswillingness to buy from the rm with a
higher price and a higher wage less frequently after the introduction of a high minimum
wage. Furthermore, the strategy of consumers to split the demand equally between the two
rms is chosen more frequently when a minimum wage is abolished and decreases when a
high minimum wage is introduced, suggesting crowding out of fairness concerns. Overall,
we nd that changes in economic policy not only change the set of choices, but also the
fairness concerns of consumers, measured as changes in their preferences for specic types
of allocations. Thus, regulation can indeed crowd out fairness concerns or change the
perception of what constitutes a fair outcome.
Related literature In the light of the experimental literature on fairness, it is not sur-
prising that consumers in our experiment care about the wage of the worker. Experimental
evidence has shown repeatedly that many peoples choices cannot be reconciled with purely
selsh preferences. In the dictator game (e.g. Forsythe, Horowitz, Savin and Sefton 1994,
Roth 1995) proposers often allocate positive amounts of money to another player, which is
in line with other-regarding preferences.
The game used here is related to the three-person ultimatum game by Güth and van
Damme (1998) where the proposer can allocate money to a responder and to a dummy. The
responder can accept or reject the proposal and the dummy is passive although his payo¤
depends on the actions of the other players. Experimental tests of this game show that the
responder earns more than the dummy on average, see Güth and van Damme (1998) and
Güth, Schmidt and Sutter (2007). This suggests that the responderswillingness to punish
proposers for the sake of the dummy player is limited. On the other hand, in a third-
party punishment game (Fehr and Fischbacher, 2004), where a third player can punish
the dictator in a two-person dictator game after he has made the choice, unequal splits
are frequently punished and dictators frequently split the pie equally.1 In our experiment,
since a consumer can choose between two rms he can play them o¤ against each other. In
contrast to the three-person ultimatum game and the third-party punishment game, he can
punish an unfair rm by switching to the less unfair rm. This makes punishment by the
consumer quite e¤ective. Of course, punishment is typically costly because the consumer
1All these experiments nd evidence for indirect reciprocity of participants because they reward or
punish friendly or unfriendly acts between two other participants. See also Nowak and Sigmund (1998),
Nowak and Sigmund (2005), Seinen and Schram (2006), and Engelmann and Fischbacher (2009) on indirect
reciprocity.
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might have to pay a higher price at the rm with the higher wage. Furthermore, note that
punishing a rm also punishes its worker, which renders it di¢ cult to achieve a fair outcome
in the short run.
Our experiment also relates to the literature on crowding out of intrinsic motivation with
extrinsic or economic incentives.2 Falk and Kosfeld (2006) study the interaction between
intrinsic motivation and formal rules. They examine the impact of the principals choice
to restrict the possible choices of the agent on the e¤ort level of the agent. They nd
that the intention of the principal matters, i.e., the crowding-out e¤ect of restricting the
agents choice set critically depends on the principal actually taking this choice instead of
an exogenous change in the choice set. In contrast, the minimum wage in our experiment
is introduced or abolished exogenously, i.e., by the experimenter, but we nd that it can
nevertheless a¤ect behavior adversely.
Little experimental work has been done on minimum wages yet. A notable exception
is the study by Falk, Fehr and Zehnder (2006) which focuses on the impact of a minimum
wage on the reservation wage of workers and on their fairness perceptions. Brandts and
Charness (2004) investigate the e¤ect of a minimum wage in a labor market characterized
by gift exchange between workers and employers. In contrast to these two studies, we focus
on the consumersreaction to a minimum wage, not the workers.
A large portion of the empirical literature on minimum wages investigates the employ-
ment e¤ect of raising the minimum wage. This has been rather controversial (Card 1992,
Card and Krueger 1994, Dickens, Machin, and Manning 1999). In our experimental design,
employment is exogenously xed to keep the question of what is a fair wage simpler for
the consumers. Empirical studies on minimum wages have also observed so-called spillover
e¤ects. An increase in the minimum wage has been found to increase wages by more than
the required amount (Card and Krueger 1995, Katz and Krueger 1992). In line with this
research, we observe in our experimental dataset that consumers and rms are willing to
pay more than the minimum wage. In particular, depending on the treatment the average
wage is 12%-64% above the minimum wage.3
The rest of the paper is structured as follows. Section 2 describes the design in detail.
In Section 3 we present and analyze the results. Section 4 concludes.
2See Frey (1997), Frey and Jegen (2001), Gneezy and Rustichini (2000a) and (2000b). See also Ostrom
(2000) for a discussion.
3Note that e¢ ciency-wage reasons cannot play a role in our experiment as the e¤ort of the worker is
xed.
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2 Experimental Design
We study a duopoly market with one consumer who can buy up to 10 units of a ctitious
homogeneous good. Each unit has a value of 25 points for the consumer. Both rms are
run by a manager, and we will refer to them as rms in the following. Each rm employs
one worker. The workers are actual participants in the experiment, even though they have
no choice to make. The rm can produce up to 10 units of the good. The rm chooses
a price (per unit) p 2 [0; 50] and a wage w (per unit). If no minimum wage is in place,
then w 2 [0; 50]; otherwise w 2 [w; 50]; where w 2 f3; 6g denotes the minimum wage that
is varied across treatments.4 The rms cannot price discriminate, i.e., the same price-wage
combination holds for all 10 units, and the rms do not have an option to restrict supply
except by raising the price to a prohibitively high level. Wages are paid only for units
actually sold and there are no other costs. Workers have no costs, no other source of
income than the wage, and no outside option. If a consumer buys a unit from a rm that
has chosen price p and wage w; the consumer earns 25   p for this unit, the rm makes
a prot of p   w and the worker earns w: These earnings are multiplied by the purchased
number of units in order to compute total earnings in a period.
The timing of the game is as follows. After the two rms have made their choices, the
consumer is informed about both rmsprice-wage pairs (p1; w1) and (p2; w2). He then
decides how many units to buy from each of the two rms. The consumer can buy any
combination of integer amounts from the two rms up to a total quantity of 10, and he
can also buy no units at all. At the end of each period the participants are informed about
all decisions in their group, i.e., about both rmsprice-wage combinations and about the
decision of the consumer.
The stage game with selsh agents has three subgame-perfect equilibria. In each of
these, rms set w = 0 if there is no minimum wage and w = w if there is a minimum wage.
The equilibrium prices are p = w, p = w+1 or p = w+2 (with p1 = p2), and the consumer
always buys 10 units from the cheaper rm, as long as min(p1; p2) < 25, which always
holds on the equilibrium path. O¤ the equilibrium path, the consumer buys nothing if
min(p1; p2) > 25 for both rms and an arbitrary quantity if min(p1; p2) = 25:) If both rms
choose the same price, in equilibrium the consumer can split his demand in an arbitrary
4We also conducted a few sessions for w = 1 and w = 9, but decided to focus on w = 3 and w = 6 in
later sessions. With w = 1; the minimum wage has hardly any e¤ect while it is almost always binding in
the case of w = 9.
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way between the two rms. Note that in equilibrium almost the whole surplus goes to the
consumer.5 In contrast, the payo¤s are split equally among all ve market participants if
both rms choose p = 20; w = 10 and the consumer buys 5 units from each of the rms.
In this case the payo¤ for all participants is  = 10  5 = 50: Hence the minimum wage of
3 or 6 that we implemented is below the wage that would ensure equal payo¤s.
Note that as long as the consumer buys 10 units, the total earnings in the market are
constant. How a consumer spreads his purchases across the two rms does not a¤ect the
total earnings. This has the appealing property that we can study consumersconcerns for
fairness that are not confounded with concerns for e¢ ciency.6
Details of the implementation are as follows. We used a xed-matching protocol where a
group of ve participants (one consumer and two rm-worker pairs) stayed together during
the entire experiment. The main motivation for xed groups is that we are interested in a
situation where consumer behavior can drive rm behavior. Participants kept their role for
the whole experiment in order to enhance possible inequalities and fairness concerns. The
experiment lasted for 40 periods.
An important aspect of our design is that in spite of the repeated interaction, consumers
do not have a strategic incentive to signal that they care about fairness if in fact they do
not. There is no reason to pretend to be fair in order to change other subjectsbehavior
(though consumers may still pretend to be fair to preserve a positive (self-)image). This is in
contrast to many other experiments that try to assess the fairness concerns of players such
as ultimatum, trust and gift-exchange games. In these games, signaling typically increases
the extent of fair behavior in early periods of repeated games, because the presence of a
small share of fair players (or the mere possibility that they exist) makes it possible for
selsh players to mimic them. In our experiment, since higher wages translate at least to
some degree into higher prices, selsh consumers want to signal that they do not care about
the worker but only about low prices.
5As the stage game has three equilibria with p = w, p = w + 1 or p = w + 2, collusive equilibria of
the repeated game exist due to the possibility to punish deviations. While our main focus is on wages, we
note that we do not nd evidence of collusive rm behavior (see Table 1 below). In addition, all equilibria
involve wages equal to the minimum wage. If the consumer is selsh, he does not want to pay more for a
higher wage and thus a (selsh but collusive) rm has no reason to pay higher wages.
6See Kritikos and Bolle (2001), Charness and Rabin (2002), Engelmann and Strobel (2004), and Harrison
and Johnson (2006) for evidence that experimental subjects frequently exhibit preferences to maximize the
total payo¤. These papers show that the interpretation of many experimental results as evidence for fairness
concerns is problematic since fairness concerns are frequently confounded with concerns for e¢ ciency.
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To study the e¤ects of changes in the minimum wage policy, we conducted two sets of
treatments. In the NMF treatments (No Minimum wage First), there was no minimum
wage initially, but it was introduced after the rst 20 periods. In the MF treatments
(Minimum wage First), a minimum wage was in place initially, but it was abolished after
20 periods. At the beginning of the experiment, the participants were informed that there
would be a change in the rules after 20 periods without mentioning that this change concerns
the minimum wage. They were also informed that the group composition and the role
assignment would not be changed. We implemented a market frame. In the instructions
(for the full text see the Appendix), participants are called consumers, rms, and workers,
and we used the terms pricesand wages. The minimum wage was introduced as follows.
In the MF treatments, it was stated that the wage had to equal at least w. The minimum
wage w 2 f3; 6g was varied between the sessions but kept xed within a session. After
the rst 20 periods, participants in the NMF treatments were informed that from the next
period on the wage had to be at least w, and in the MF treatments it was specied after
20 periods that from the next period on the wage had to be non-negative.
The experiment was conducted in a computer pool at the Technical University Berlin.
The experiment was programmed and run using z-Tree (Fischbacher, 2007). We had a total
of 640 subjects, 256 of which were in the role of workers who did not take any decisions.
Each subject participated only once in one of the 38 sessions, each consisting of two to four
groups of ve participants. Each group represents one independent observation. Overall,
we collected data from 32 groups for each of our treatments NMF3, NMF6, MF3 and MF6.
At the end of a session, earnings in points were converted at a rate of 200 points = 1e
and were paid out in cash. Participants received 5e in points as an initial endowment.
This served to cover possible losses which can occur if rms sell at a price below the wage
or consumers buy for a price above their valuation, and to ensure that workers get at least
some non-trivial compensation.7 The sessions took between 60 and 90 minutes and average
earnings were around 14:54e (including the initial endowment).8
7Paying the workers a higher initial endowment was not feasible because it would have changed the
egalitarian price-wage combination and more importantly would have reduced any fairness motivation to
pay them a higher wage. We did observe some participants in the role of a worker who were clearly
unhappy with the fact that they had no choice to make and also earned only slightly more than their initial
endowment.
8If the consumers buy 10 units (all other decisions only determine the distribution of rents among
players), the average payo¤s are 10 Euro plus 5 Euro initial capital. The slightly lower earnings that we
observe result from consumers occasionally buying fewer than 10 units.
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3 Results
In this section, we rst provide an overview of the prices and wages set by rms and the
resulting distribution of earnings (Section 3.1). In Section 3.2 we investigate the choices
of consumers. How the choices of consumers are a¤ected by the minimum wage policy is
addressed in Section 3.3 where we present a model of consumer choice to test for crowding-in
and crowing-out e¤ects of minimum wage policies.
3.1 Firm Behavior
3.1.1 Wage and Price Dynamics
We start our analysis by looking at the wage and price o¤ers over time as plotted in Figure 1.
The values reported are those set by the rms, not only the wages and prices that were
actually paid.9
Figure 1: Average price o¤ers (squares) and wage o¤ers (circles) over time in MF (solid)
and NMF (dotted) for w = 3 (left panel) and w = 6 (right panel).
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Interestingly, in all treatments the starting values of the wage and price o¤ers are close
9We observe some cases where it appears that a participant in the role of the rm confused wage and
price. We infer this from the fact that for one period the participant reversed a price-wage pattern that
he had chosen before and afterwards. We generally excluded these observations from the analysis in the
paper (2.96% of the data). Including them, however, neither a¤ects any of our results quantitatively nor
the signicance of any of the treatment e¤ects.
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to the fair allocation, independent of the minimum wage levels. In fact, using Fisher-Pitman
permutation tests we cannot reject the hypothesis that the average wage o¤ers in the rst
periods are equal to 10 both on an aggregate level as well as for each treatment separately.
The average price o¤ers in the rst period are signicantly higher than 20 in all treatments
but MF3 (23:5 on average). These ndings suggest that participants in the role of rms
understand the game and are able to determine the fair outcome.
However, during the rst periods the wages and prices drop dramatically in all treat-
ments. Indeed, if we focus on the rst six periods, all treatments show a signicantly
negative time trend in the average wage and price o¤er.10 In contrast, in periods 720
there are almost no signicant time trends.11 The observed dynamics in the early periods
of all treatments can be interpreted as some rms initially expecting consumers and other
rms to be more concerned with fair wages and prices than they actually are. When they
discover that the consumer they are paired with mainly cares about prices and that the
other rm does not set a high wage (in combination with a high price), they lower their
wage and price.
Also, regarding the dynamics after a policy change, the rst six periods of the second
half show decreasing wages and prices while again wages and prices are much more stable
in periods 27-40.12 As we are interested in medium-run behavior that is fairly stable over
time, we exclude the rst six periods of each part of the experiment for the analysis in the
remainder of the paper.
3.1.2 Wage and Price Levels
In order to analyze the aggregate e¤ect of a minimum wage on the market outcome, Table 1
gives an overview of the average wage o¤ers, the average price o¤ers as well as the average
earnings of each market participant for each treatment and part.13
10We run OLS regressions with the average price (wage) o¤er as the dependent variable, and a separate
intercept and time trend per treatment as independent variables (clustered standard errors).
11In periods 720 the wages show no signicant time trend at all, and the prices show a signicant but
moderate time trend in NMF3 only.
12In periods 2740, the time trends of the average wage o¤ers are signicant in MF6 only, while the
trends of the average price o¤ers stay signicant in NMF3, NMF6 and MF6. However, the magnitude of
these trends is much lower than in the rst six periods of each half.
13Reported test results are based on OLS regressions per treatment with the average wage o¤er, price
o¤er, and prots as dependent variables and a dummy for the minimum wage regime as the independent
variable. Standard errors are clustered on the group level.
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Table 1: Average price o¤ers, wage o¤ers and payo¤s.
NMF MF
w t2f7;:::;20g t2f27;:::;40g change t2f7;:::;20g t2f27;:::;40g change
w 3 3:51 4:72 1:20 4:92 3:33  1:59
6 3:74 6:92 3:18 6:69 3:20  3:50
w 3 30:13 43:10 12:98
 45:36 29:26  16:10
6 30:38 64:51 34:14 64:13 30:00  34:13
p 3 12:95 13:32 0:38 12:35 11:47  0:88
6 13:07 15:13 2:06 14:93 12:14  2:79
c 3 127:10 122:52  4:58 140:94 148:58 7:64
6 124:16 107:07  17:08 115:56 142:06 26:49
f 3 77:52 70:92  6:60 58:49 67:17 8:67
6 77:90 68:07  9:83 66:49 76:25 9:76
Note: p-values based on clustered standard errors: * p < 0:1, ** p < 0:05, *** p < 0:01.
First note that average wages are often far above the wage predicted in equilibrium with
selsh players. Without a minimum wage, average wages are always higher than 3 in all
treatments, which is signicantly di¤erent from the predicted wage of 0 (all p < 0:001), and
average prices are always above 11, which is again signicantly higher than the predicted
price of at most 2 (p < 0:001 for all treatments). For example, in the parts of MF3 and in
NMF3 when no minimum wage is in place, the average wage is 3.51 and 3.33, respectively.
And even when a minimum wage is in place, average wages and prices are above the
predicted level (p < 0:001 for all treatments).14 For example, in the parts of treatments
MF3 and NMF3 when a minimum wage is in place, the average wage is 4.92 and 4.72
respectively.
From Table 1 it can also be taken that the average wage o¤ers and hence the work-
ersearnings signicantly increase when a minimum wage is introduced and signicantly
decrease when a minimum wage is abolished. On the other hand, the price level and the
consumersprots (rows 5-8 in the table) are only a¤ected signicantly when the minimum
wage is su¢ ciently high (NMF6 and MF6). In these two treatments, the introduction of
a minimum wage increases average price o¤ers and decreases consumer prots while its
abolishment decreases average price o¤ers and increases consumer prots. Since the price
14In absence of a minimum wage, 80:0% of the wage o¤ers are above 0, and 95:7% of the price o¤ers are
above 2. In presence of a minimum wage, 37:6% of the wage o¤ers are above the minimum wage in place,
and 89:9% of price o¤ers exceed the minimum wage in place by more than 2 units.
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o¤ers tend to be more sticky than the wage o¤ers (changes in prices over time are always
smaller than respective wage changes), the rms tend to lose from the introduction of a
minimum wage (marginally signicant in NMF6) while the abolishment of a minimum wage
signicantly increases rm prots (MF3 and MF6).
Observation 1 (i) Average wages and prices are higher than the predicted values with
selsh players in all treatments. (ii) The introduction of a minimum wage leads to higher
wage o¤ers and earnings of the workers, and the abolishment of a minimum wage lowers
wage o¤ers and earnings of the workers.
3.2 Consumer behavior
The analysis in the previous section has demonstrated that wages are often above the level
of the subgame-perfect equilibrium with selsh rms and consumers. In this section, we
investigate whether the consumersbehavior is a¤ected by the wages and prices set by the
rms.
If a consumer is purely self-interested, we expect him to buy 10 units from the cheaper
rm in periods where the price o¤ers di¤er. When price o¤ers do not di¤er, self-interested
consumers should buy 10 units with an arbitrary split between rms.
We observe two clear deviations of the consumerschoices from this prediction. First,
consumers do not buy 10 units in total from both rms in 7:5% of the cases even though
in only 0:5% of the cases both prices are equal to or above the consumersvaluation of
25. The second notable deviation from the game-theoretic prediction with selsh players is
that in 16:3% of the cases the consumers do not buy exclusively from the strictly cheaper
rm. In the following, we will explore the driving forces of these choices and investigate
how they are a¤ected by policy changes.
3.2.1 Buying less than 10 units
Buying less than 10 units in total may either be motivated by self-interest if consumers
try to break collusive behavior of the rms, or by social concerns for the workers when the
consumers regard the overall wage level as too low. Although such a boycott is the most
powerful tool to change the behavior of the rms, it is costly for the consumers since the
loss of buying less than 10 units is much higher than buying from a rm with a relatively
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high price.15
If the willingness to buy less than 10 units is driven by social concerns for the workers,
we should observe this behavior more often when wage o¤ers are low. On the other hand,
if the consumers buy less than 10 units out of self-interest, we would expect to observe it
more often when the lower of both price o¤ers pl is high. Table 2 reports regressions where
we estimated the e¤ect of the wage and price structure in the market on the consumers
propensity to reduce consumption below 10 units.
Table 2: Consumerspropensity to buy less than ten units.
Model: Probit
Dependent variable: Ifq1+q2<10g
NMF3 NMF6 MF3 MF6
pl = minfp1; p2g 0:068 0:094 0:065 0:156
(0.026) (0.027) (0.035) (0.042)
wl = minfw1; w2g  0:036  0:040  0:055 0:036
(0.044) (0.061) (0.047) (0.050)
jp1   p2j 0:003  0:005 0:007 0:000
(0.013) (0.019) (0.013) (0.016)
jw1   w2j 0:047  0:038  0:040  0:009
(0.036) (0.046) (0.037) (0.032)
It>20  0:016  0:413  0:187 0:123
(0.133) (0.298) (0.230) (0.342)
const  1:994  1:975  2:177  4:710
(0.285) (0.548) (0.477) (0.811)
n 875 876 864 863
log`  295:71  300:47  134:05  55:98
2 14:00 20:93 5:75 15:77
Note: Clustered standard errors in parentheses: * p < 0:1, ** p < 0:05, *** p < 0:01.
The dummy variable It>20 is 0 for all observations in rounds 120 and 1 for all
observations in rounds 2140.
The regressions show that the consumerspropensity to buy less than 10 units is sig-
nicantly increasing in the lower of both prices in all treatments, except in MF3 with only
15Nevertheless,we observe that boycotts are sometimes quite extreme. In 19:8% of the cases where the
consumers bought less than 10 units in total (and at least one price o¤er is below 25), they boycott both
rms completely and buy nothing.
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marginal signicance. Since wages do not have any signicant e¤ect, we conclude:16
Observation 2 The consumers willingness to buy less than 10 units is driven by self-
interest only, with higher prices decreasing the likelihood that all 10 units are bought.
3.2.2 Buying from the more expensive rm
We now turn to cases in which the consumers do not buy all units at the cheaper rm. With
reference to the preceding section, we rst note that the consumerspropensity to buy from
the rm with the strictly higher price is unrelated to the propensity to buy less than 10
units. Both actions together occur in only 1:3% of the cases and they are statistically
independent.17 This is not surprising as buying from the rm with the higher price cannot
be driven by self-interest while we nd that buying less than 10 units is merely driven by
self-interest.
Figure 2: Panel A: Histogram of units bought at a strictly higher price. Panel B: Kernel
density estimates of the number of units bought at the high-price-high-wage rm for high
(solid line), intermediate (dashed line) and low wage wl (dotted line).
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16Including the average wage (price) o¤ers instead of the lowest of both wage (price) o¤ers does not change
the corresponding coe¢ cient (nor its signicance). Hence, we cannot e¤ectively di¤erentiate between an
e¤ect of the average wage (price) o¤er or the lower of both wage (price) o¤ers.
17A probit regression of a dummy variable for consumers buying less than 10 units on a dummy variable
for consumers buying at the rm with the strictly higher price as the independent variable yields p = 0:860
(clustered standard errors).
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Figure 2.A shows the histogram of the number of units bought from the strictly more
expensive rm. The distribution has three peaks. First, the consumers often buy one or
two units at the rm with the strictly higher price, which is close to the self-interested
choice of zero. Second, consumers often buy an equal number of units at each rm even
though the two prices di¤er.18 Third, consumers occasionally buy all units from the rm
with the higher price. These observations are unlikely to be due to confusion since in 84:7%
of the cases where the consumers bought more units from the rm with the higher price,
this rm also o¤ered a higher wage. Interestingly, both strategies (buying ve units from
each rm and buying 10 units from the more expensive rm) are well separated from each
other since there is only little mass on 7; 8, and 9 units.
Our main interest is in the question how wages a¤ect the consumerspurchasing deci-
sions. To get a rst impression of this e¤ect, Figure 2.B shows the kernel density estimates
for the number of units bought at the rm which has both the higher price and the higher
wage (conditional on such a rm existing and at least one unit being bought at this rm)
for di¤erent levels of the lower of both wage o¤ers wl = minfw1; w2g.19 The graph suggests
that moving from high to low wl, the percentage of cases in which the same number of units
is bought from both rms declines from 23:5% (high wl) to 17:4% (medium wl) to 13:1%
(low wl). Similarly, the fraction of purchases where all units are bought from the more
expensive rm increases from 2:7% (high wl) to 10:8% (medium wl) to 21:1% (low wl).
Splitting purchases equally or buying all units from the more expensive rmmight reect
short-term and long-term fairness considerations, respectively. A consumer who wants to
split payo¤s equally in the current period would buy equal or almost equal shares from
both rms, even if prices and wages di¤er.20 A consumer who wants to induce rms to
increase wages could buy all 10 units from the rm with the higher wage and the higher
price ("buy-by-wage" strategy). Thus, equal splits of purchases appear to primarily reect
18When considering the whole data set (i.e., including observations where prices are equal), buying ve
units from each rm is the second most frequent choice of consumers (16:0%), which is only chosen less
often than buying 10 units from one rm (66:7%).
19The density estimations use a Gaussian kernel with a bandwidth of 0:58. A low wl is dened as wl  2,
an intermediate wl as 2 < wl  5 and a high wl level as wl > 5. The categories have been chosen such that
the number of observations per category is as similar as possible (175, 167 and 226, respectively).
20The precise split depends on the fairness motives of the consumer. For example, a consumer with
maximin preferences would buy more units from the rm with the lower wage, such that the payo¤s of
both workers are equal. E.g. if w1 = 2 and w2 = 3, buying six units from Firm 1 and four units from Firm
2 would lead to total earnings of 12 for both workers. This satises maximin preferences if pi   wi  wi
for i = 1; 2.
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static fairness concerns, whereas purchases of all units from the rm with the higher price
and the higher wage may reect long-term concerns for workers or indirect reciprocity.
In order to better understand consumer behavior, we will analyze both strategies of
consumers below. We focus on the extreme strategies of buying exactly equal shares from
both rms or buying all units from the high-price high-wage rm. These are by far the
most prominent strategies among all strategies where the consumer buys at least as many
units from the high-price as from the low-price rm (see Figure 2).
Buying the same number of units from both rms The strategy to buy equal
amounts at both rms might reect the consumerswish to maximize the minimum payo¤
among market participants. The reason is that a worker is among the least earning market
participants in 82:4% of all observations and in case of identical wage o¤ers (51:1% of the
observations) attempts to maximize the lowest worker prot would lead a consumer with
maximin preferences to buy ve units from each rm. If the observed behavior of buying
similar numbers of units from both rms is indeed driven by maximin preferences, we
would expect consumers who face di¤ering wage o¤ers to buy more from the rm with the
lower wage o¤er. However, since the calculation of the optimal distribution given maximin
preferences is not trivial to compute, consumers might use a simple equipartition rule as a
heuristic in order to support both workers roughly equally.
Figure 2.A shows that substantial mass of the distribution is located between zero and
ve units. This could either indicate that consumers have maximin preferences (and the
high-price rm pays the higher wage) or that the consumerswillingness to support both
workers equally is reduced if the di¤erence between prices or the price level are very high. In
order to examine the validity of these potential explanations, Table 3 reports on regressions
where we estimate the e¤ects of the price and wage structure on the consumerspropensity
to split purchases equally. The estimations reveal that the consumerspropensity to buy
equal shares is increasing in the lower of both wage o¤ers wl (signicant in NMF3 and
MF6 and marginally signicant in NMF6 and MF3). This is consistent with the view that
fair consumers choose an equal split to equalize earnings if they nd that wages are at a
satisfactory level. Furthermore, the absolute price di¤erence (in contrast to the price level)
has a negative e¤ect on the consumerspropensity to split units equally (though this is
signicant only in the MF6 treatment), which corroborates the hypothesis that concerns
for equality decrease when equality is relatively more expensive.
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Table 3: Consumerspropensity to split units equally among rms.
Model: OLS
Dependent variable:  jq1   q2j
Observations: p1 6= p2
NMF3 NMF6 MF3 MF6
pl = minfp1; p2g 0:075 0:094 0:096 0:071
(0.057) (0.058) (0.068) (0.048)
wl = minfw1; w2g 0:333 0:362 0:253 0:470
(0.096) (0.202) (0.147) (0.160)
jp1   p2j  0:025  0:040  0:038  0:086
(0.020) (0.029) (0.025) (0.024)
jw1   w2j 0:118  0:037  0:041 0:177
(0.065) (0.073) (0.055) (0.113)
It>20  0:685  2:415 1:064 2:491
(0.298) (0.762) (0.466) (0.663)
const  9:930  9:781  10:786  12:425
(0.578) (0.734) (0.717) (0.706)
n 622 615 631 655
R2 0:112 0:14 0:13 0:18
2 6:10 3:76 2:26 8:81
Note: Clustered standard errors in parentheses: * p < 0:1, ** p < 0:05, ***
p < 0:01. The dummy variable It>20 is 0 for all observations in rounds 120
and 1 for all observations in rounds 2140.
As already noted, with maximin preferences the consumerspropensity to buy equal
shares should depend on the absolute wage di¤erence. However, the coe¢ cient of jw1 w2j
is not signicant or only marginally signicant in NMF3. Although this nding already casts
some doubt on the hypothesis of maximin preferences, we employ a nite mixture model
to estimate the proportion of observations that are consistent with each of the strategies
considered thus far.21 These include the self-interested strategy (buy all units at the lowest
price, split units arbitrarily if prices are equal), the maximin strategy (choose q1 and q2 such
that minimum payo¤ of all market participants is maximized), the equipartition strategy
(buy 5 units at each rm), the buy-by-wage strategy (buy all units at the highest wage, split
units arbitrarily if wages are equal) and a randomization strategy (split units arbitrarily).
21We excluded the observations where the consumers bought less than 10 units in total since none of the
strategies above makes reasonable (and nonambiguous) predictions in these cases.
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We include the latter in order to capture observations that are not predicted by any of the
other strategies (though these observations might be the result of a weighted application
of more than one of the strategies considered here, see Section 3.3). To construct the log
likelihood function, we assign a likelihood of 1 if an observed choice meets the prediction
of the strategy considered and 0 otherwise. In cases where a strategy makes non-unique
predictions, an observation that has been predicted is assigned a likelihood of 1=(# predicted
values). Following this approach we nd that 68:8% of the data are explained by self-
interested behavior. The estimated weight of the equipartition heuristic amounts to 8:5%
while the weight of maximin behavior is the lowest of all with 2:8% only. The buy-by-wage
strategy and unexplained choices amount to 5:2% and 14:7%; respectively. While all weights
are signicantly di¤erent from zero, the weight of the equipartition heuristic is signicantly
larger than the weight of maximin behavior (p = 0:006).22
Observation 3 The consumers propensity to buy similar shares from both rms (i) in-
creases in the wage level, (ii) decreases the more the two prices di¤er, and (iii) can mainly
be ascribed to an equipartition heuristic rather than maximin preferences.
Buying all units from the rm with the higher wage As Figure 2 reveals, a substan-
tial number of consumers buy all units from the rm with the higher wage. One possible
explanation is that consumers who care for the workers use this strategy to punish a rm
for paying too low wages. If this is the case, we expect the consumerswillingness to buy
all units from the high-price high-wage rm to depend negatively on the lower of both
wage o¤ers. Furthermore, due to the price sensitivity of fairness concerns, we expect that
the consumerswillingness to buy from the more expensive rm is lower the higher the
di¤erence in the price o¤ers.
In order to test these hypotheses, Table 4 reports the regression results of the consumers
willingness to buy all units from the high-price high-wage rm on the price and wage
structure. The estimations show that this propensity of consumers is indeed decreasing in
the lower of both wage o¤ers, though this e¤ect is signicant only in MF3 and marginally
22Restricting the analysis to observations where non-selsh behavior is costly (p1 6= p2), we nd that
the estimated weight of maximin behavior is not di¤erent from zero (p = 0:515) while the weights of all
other strategies remain signicantly di¤erent from zero. The corresponding weight estimates are 75:5% for
self-interested behavior, 2:4% for the equipartition heuristic, 0:3% for maximin behavior, 2:1% for buy-by-
wage, and 19:7% for noise. The weight of the equipartition heuristic remains signicantly higher than the
weight of maximin behavior (p = 0:0429).
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Table 4: Consumerspropensity to buy all units from the high-price
high-wage rm.
Model: Probit
Dependent variable: Ifqi=qi+qj jpi>pj^wi>wjg
Observations: pi > pj ^ wi > wj
NMF3 NMF6 MF3 MF6
pl = minfp1; p2g 0:039 0:114  0:044 0:024
(0.032) (0.042) (0.087) (0.045)
wl = minfw1; w2g  0:001  0:141  0:227  0:022
(0.063) (0.073) (0.115) (0.071)
jp1   p2j  0:002 0:012  0:572 0:020
(0.021) (0.053) (0.137) (0.019)
jw1   w2j 0:071  0:022 0:340  0:024
(0.036) (0.055) (0.146) (0.059)
It>20  0:017  0:450 0:840 0:967
(0.226) (0.383) (0.253) (0.465)
const  2:081  2:457  0:977  2:533
(0.330) (0.397) (0.690) (0.792)
n 284 271 315 237
log`  76:77  51:71  51:10  48:93
2 49:27 16:59 31:45 11:49
Note: Clustered standard errors in parentheses: * p < 0:1, ** p < 0:05, ***
p < 0:01. The dummy variable It>20 is 0 for all observations in rounds 120 and
1 for all observations in rounds 2140.
signicant in NMF6. Moreover, the absolute wage di¤erence exerts a signicant positive
e¤ect on the consumerswillingness to buy all units from the high-price high-wage rm in
NMF3 and MF3. Thus, after controlling for prices and the wage at the low-price low-wage
rm, consumers are more willing to pay a high price the higher the wage at the high-price
high-wage rm. These results are consistent with the hypothesis that buying all units from
the high-price high-wage rm is a long-term strategy to encourage rms to pay higher
wages. Again, we nd evidence of the price sensitivity of fairness concerns. In MF3 the
absolute price di¤erence exerts a signicant negative e¤ect and in NMF6 the price of the
other (low-price low-wage) rm has a signicant positive e¤ect.
Observation 4 (i) A signicant proportion of consumers are willing to buy all units from
the rm with the higher price as long as it o¤ers a higher wage. (ii) Consumers more often
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buy all units from the high-price high-wage rm, the lower the wage o¤er of the low-wage
rm and the higher the wage di¤erence between rms.
3.3 Policy changes and consumer behavior
The consumerssense of fairness is expressed in two di¤erent ways, namely an inclination to
split purchases equally across rms even if prices di¤er and an inclination to buy all units
from the rm with a higher wage and a higher price. We have observed that the choice of
the two strategies depends on prices and wages in the market. We have also observed that
policy changes a¤ect wages directly since the minimum wage is often binding.23 In this
section we study whether changes in the consumerschoices can be explained by changes
in wages and prices alone or whether the consumersfairness perceptions are a¤ected by
policy changes per se, in particular whether minimum wages crowd out of fairness concerns.
Some rst answers to this question can be taken from the raw data and from the
regressions reported in Tables 3 and 4. When simply counting the fraction of consumers who
buy the same number of units at both rms at least once, the introduction of a minimum
wage in the NMF treatments leads to a drop from 23=64 to 19=64:This fraction increases
from 13=64 to 19=64 in the MF treatments after the abolishment of the minimum wage.24
Regarding the second strategy, the introduction of a minimum wage in the NMF treatments
decreases the fraction of consumers buying at least once all units from the high-price high-
wage rm from 18=64 to 7=64. In the MF treatments this fraction increases from 2=64 to
15=64 when the minimum wage is abolished.25
The regressions reported in Tables 3 and 4 include the dummy It>20 to capture changes
in behavior after the policy change while controlling for changes in the price and wage
structure. Table 3 shows crowding-out and crowding-in e¤ects in that consumers split their
purchases less equally after the introduction of a minimum wage in the NMF treatments
while they split them more equally after the minimum wage has been abolished in the MF
treatments. According to Table 4, the strategy to buy all units from the high-price high-
23We studied minimum wage levels that are true interventions in the markets. Given all observations in
the rst half of the NMF treatments, 48% [76%] of the wage o¤ers are below the considered minimum wage
levels of w = 3 [w = 6].
24As in Table 3 we focus on observations where p1 6= p2. Note however, that these changes are not
signicant: A two-sided Fishers exact test yields p = 0:573 and p = 0:307, respectively.
25As in Table 4, we focus on observations where pi > pj and wi > wj . The two-sided Fishers exact test
yields p = 0:024 and p = 0:001, respectively.
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wage rm is crowded in by removing the minimum wage in the MF treatments while there
is no signicant crowding-out e¤ect in the NMF treatments.
This evidence is suggestive of changes in consumer preferences. However, the regression
analysis considers the two fairness strategies of the consumers one at a time and does not
allow us to assess their relative importance and whether this is a¤ected by policy choices.
In the following, a model that captures both fairness strategies along with their dependence
on the price and wage o¤ers is presented. Before we describe the model, we briey discuss
why prominent fairness models are not well suited to capture the fair behavior observed in
our experiment.
3.3.1 Existing fairness models
We observe rst that inequality aversion models such as Fehr and Schmidt (1999) or Bolton
and Ockenfels (2000) are not able to capture the two types of fair behavior we observe. Ac-
cording to both models, subjects do not discriminate among other players who all have
a higher or all have a lower payo¤ than themselves (according to Bolton and Ockenfels,
subjects are not even concerned with redistributing from those who have more than them-
selves to those who have less). Thus, given that in our experiment the consumers almost
always earn the highest payo¤, they should not care how the remaining surplus is distrib-
uted among the rms and workers according to these models. The fair behavior we observe
is only reasonable if consumers care about the distribution among the other players. This
aspect is better captured by Charness and Rabin (2002) who assign a special weight to
the subject with the lowest payo¤ or by Cox, Friedman, and Sadiraj (2008) who model
utility as concave in all subjectspayo¤s. However, even these models do not capture the
behavior in our experiment as they do not address the tension between short-term and
long-term considerations exhibited by the two di¤erent fairness strategies that we observe.
Essentially, the models are static and do not allow for a trade-o¤ between current-period
utility and an attempt to teach rms to be fair in the future.26
Models of reciprocity such as Dufwenberg and Kirchsteiger (2004) or Falk and Fis-
chbacher (2006) cannot account for our results either, as reciprocity would suggest that
the low-price rm is rewarded with more purchases, a behavior indistinguishable from self-
26One could also apply the model by Charness and Rabin (2002) to the entire repeated game rather than
to the stage game, thereby allowing for intricate strategies of teaching rms to change wages. This would,
however, put all the weight on the long-term concern and thus would not capture the trade-o¤ between the
two di¤erent types of fairness strategies.
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ishness. One could expand these models to incorporate indirect reciprocity, which would
be consistent with rewarding rms that pay higher wages. However, this would compli-
cate the models and make them intractable as one would need to consider how consumers
trade o¤ direct reciprocity (reaction to prices) with indirect reciprocity (reaction to wages).
Furthermore, beliefs are crucial in this approach and an extension to indirect reciprocity
would require nding answers to questions such as whether the beliefs of the workers (and
the second-order beliefs of the consumer and rms regarding the workersbeliefs) matter
as well.
3.3.2 A model of consumer choice
Instead of building on any of the established models of fair behavior, we present a stylized
model that directly incorporates the two fairness strategies of consumers that we observe,
namely an equal split of purchases and buying less at the low-wage low-price rm. This
stylized model does not propose a novel theory of social preferences, but is tailored to our
game in order to capture how consumers trade o¤ these two motives and self-interest. This
allows us to estimate how the weight that the consumers assign to both motives relative
to their self-interest changes with the minimum wage policy. Specically, we assume that
subjects maximize the following utility function:
u(r1jp; w) =  
h
r1p

1 + (1  r1)p2
i
+ h [r1w

1 + (1  r1)w2 ] + e [r1(1  r1)] : (1)
The rst term captures self-interest, where r1 denotes the proportion of units the con-
sumer buys from rm 1. The parameter  captures the marginal disutility of prices.
Hence, for  > 0 higher prices decrease utility and a purely self-interested consumer
(h ! 0; e ! 0;) always buys the maximum number of units from the cheapest rm.
The second term in (1) captures the preference for high wages if  > 0 and h > 0, where 
determines the marginal utility of wages and h determines the importance of the taste for
su¢ ciently high wages compared to the other preference components. For h !1 (and e
is bounded) the consumer is exclusively interested in buying from the rm with the higher
wage. Finally, the third term reects the consumers taste for dividing the number of units
equally between rms when e > 0. For e ! 1 (and h is bounded) the consumer is
solely interested in buying ve units at each rm.
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In order to estimate the parameters of the model, we derive the best response of the
consumers to a specic price-wage tuple, which is given by
r1(p; w) = min
(
max
( 
1
2
+
(p2   p1 ) + h(w1   w2 )
2e
!
; 0
)
; 1
)
(2)
Since we want to capture policy e¤ects on the consumers behavior that are beyond pure
adjustment e¤ects to di¤erent prices and wages, we estimate the fairness parameters h and
e for the NMF and MF treatments separately while we include a dummy for the second
half of the experiment for both parameters. We minimize the squared di¤erence between
the observed fraction of units bought from rm 1 and the predicted fraction (2) with respect
to the model parameters. Note that we do not put any restrictions on the parameters in
the estimation procedure. For computational reasons, we replace the step link function in
(2) by a logit link function.27 For the estimations, we include those observations where the
consumers bought less than ten units, but our main results are robust to excluding these
observations.28
The descriptive model performs well since the variance left unexplained as a fraction of
the total variance amounts to 15:4% only (adjusted R2 = 0:845). Furthermore, given that
we did not impose any parameter restrictions, the fact that all estimates are in the expected
range is reassuring. In addition, the estimates of  and  corroborate the ndings from
the preceding sections. Specically, regarding the marginal utility of wages, the estimation
yields ^ = 0:570 which is signicantly di¤erent from both 0 and 1. This suggests that for
higher average wage levels, consumers become less sensitive to wage di¤erences and decrease
their willingness to buy from the rm with the higher wage in favor of buying similar shares
at both rms and of buying for lower prices overall. Furthermore, the estimated parameter
determining the curvature of the marginal disutility of prices ^ = 0:896 is slightly but not
signicantly smaller than 1, which suggests that the disutility of a marginal price increase
is independent of the average price level. Thus, the price level does not a¤ect the fairness
considerations of consumers. The fact that ^ is signicantly larger than 0 shows that
fairness of the consumers is price sensitive, that is, if the price di¤erence becomes larger,
they buy more from the cheaper rm. The estimation results with respect to the remaining
27Using the normal distribution as an alternative link function yields a worse t to the data.
28In line with the previous analysis, we exclude the rst six periods of each half as well as the periods
where the consumers made obvious errors.
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parameters are presented in Table 5.
Table 5: Estimation of policy e¤ects on con-
sumerspreferences.
t2f7;:::;20g t2f27;:::;40g change
NMF3 h 0:304 0:458 0:154
e 0:147
 0:134  0:013
NMF6 h 0:282 0:000  0:282
e 0:187
 0:117  0:070
MF3 h 0:449 0:610 0:162
e 0:121
 0:249 0:127
MF6 h 0:397 0:502 0:105
e 0:126
 0:255 0:129
Note: p-values based on clustered standard errors:
* p < 0:1, ** p < 0:05, *** p < 0:01.
We note rst that in the estimations based on the whole data set, both dimensions of
the consumersfairness concerns are relevant since the parameter estimates for e and h
are signicantly di¤erent from zero in each part of the experiment with the exception of
h after the introduction of a minimum wage w = 6. Thus for the average consumer both
motives matter whether there is a minimum wage in place or not.
Our main interest lies in the e¤ect of changes in the minimum wage regime on the
consumersfairness preferences reported in the last column of Table 5. First, we observe
that the introduction of the minimum wage of 6 in NMF6 signicantly decreases the weights
of both fair strategies, h and e. Second, the abolishment of a minimum wage (both
in MF3 and MF6) increases e signicantly while h is at best marginally signicantly
a¤ected, suggesting that consumers become more concerned about splitting their purchases
equally.29 Note that these e¤ects are not due to changes in prices and wages, as such
changes are controlled for in the estimations.
Of particular interest for the question how regulation a¤ects the fairness concerns of
consumers is the comparison of inexperienced consumers (i.e., those who have not yet
experienced the other policy regime) between treatments. Comparing the rst part of both
treatments shows that the presence of a minimum wage reduces the consumerspreference
29Tests within the treatments MF3 and MF6 separately as well as tests aggregated over both treatments
yield p(H0:e=0)  0:001 and p(H0:h=0)  0:089.
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for equipartition (for w = 6 and on the aggregate30) while it has no signicant e¤ect on the
consumersstrategy to buy from the high-wage rm.31
Finally, crowding-in e¤ects after the abolishment of a minimum wage make the con-
sumersfairness preferences even more pronounced than when consumers have no experience
with a minimum wage. Comparing markets without a minimum wage that have experi-
enced a minimum wage before (MF, periods 27-40) with those markets where participants
have no experience and there is no minimum wage (NMF, periods 7-20), we nd that both,
h and e, are signicantly larger in the former.32 Given the previous results of crowding
out and crowding in, it is not surprising that after the abolishment of a minimum wage
(MF, periods 27-40) both, h and e, are signicantly higher than after the introduction of
a minimum wage (NMF, periods 27-40).33 We conclude
Observation 5 (i) The consumers tendency to buy equal shares from both rms and to
buy only at the high-wage rm can be identied as separate strategies in addition to choices
driven by self-interest. (ii) The introduction of a minimum wage of 6 decreases both the
consumerspreference for high wages and their preference for equal splits of purchases. The
abolishment of a minimum wage increases the consumerswillingness to buy equal amounts
from both rms. (iii) Aggregating over the size of the minimum wage and comparing all
four scenarios, the consumersfairness preferences as exhibited through the choice of these
two strategies are strongest after the abolishment of a minimum wage.
The results of the model estimation and the regression results above are overall con-
sistent with respect to the sign of the changes. Di¤erences between the two approaches
in terms of signicance levels of the e¤ects of policy changes can be due to the fact that
the model incorporates both strategies of fair consumers simultaneously in addition to self-
interest, which is not the case for the regressions.
30The corresponding p-values for w = 6 and on aggregate are p(H0:e=0)  0:017; for w = 3 the p-value
is p(H0:e=0) = 0:238.
31Tests for w = 3, w = 6, and on aggregate yield p(H0:h=0)  0:159.
32The corresponding p-values for the data with w = 3, w = 6 and on aggregate are p(H0:h=0)  0:005
and p(H0:e=0)  0:027.
33The corresponding p-values are for w = 3, w = 6, and on aggregate are p(H0:h=0)  0:005 and
p(H0:e=0)  0:027.
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4 Conclusions
Over the last decades, important insights into fairness concerns have been gained from
experimental research. Much of this research, however, investigates situations where it is
rather obvious what would constitute fair behavior and how fair outcomes can be achieved.
Outside the laboratory, it is often complicated to achieve fair outcomes or even to decide
what constitutes a fair outcome. We have studied an experimental market where consumers
have to take complex decisions to achieve fair outcomes. We have also introduced a policy
change in the market in order to investigate how this a¤ects consumer choices and market
outcomes.
We have found that although the consumers act self-interestedly in most of the cases,
they reveal a substantial willingness to forgo own payo¤s in order to support the workers.
Specically, we have identied two strategies of the consumers to implement a fair market
outcome. First, the consumers exhibit a preference for an equal split of the purchased
quantities even if the prices of the rms di¤er. Second, if the average wage level is low, the
consumers sometimes buy all units from the more expensive rm if it o¤ers a higher wage.
Buying a similar number of units can be interpreted as implementing a fair outcome in the
short-run if the wage level is high enough. But if wages are too low, fair minded consumers
shift purchases to the rm with the higher wage, presumably to encourage higher wages
in later rounds. As can be expected from rational consumers, both strategies are chosen
less often when they are too costly, i.e., when the di¤erence in prices is too high. We thus
observe that although achieving fair outcomes for all participants is far from trivial in our
game, a number of participants in the role of consumers make an e¤ort to do so. The
behavior of consumers encourages rms to raise wages above the minimum level.
Do legal standards a¤ect ethical concerns of consumers? We observe that introducing a
minimum wage has a positive e¤ect on the welfare of workers because the direct e¤ect (i.e.,
the minimum wage is frequently binding) overcompensates the negative indirect (crowding-
out) e¤ect. The abolishment of a minimumwage clearly increases the consumerswillingness
to forgo own income in order to support the workers. However, this crowding-in e¤ect is
overcompensated by the direct e¤ect of the abolishment of the minimum wage such that
workers in sum su¤er from the abolishment of a minimum wage. Furthermore, consumers
act as if they care less about the equal distribution of purchases if a minimum wage is
in place initially. Therefore, both comparing across treatments for the same phase of the
experiment and within treatments across time, we nd that the presence of a minimum
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wage weakens fairness concerns by consumers, but that this e¤ect is dominated by the
direct e¤ect of the minimum wage, because it is frequently binding.
Obviously, since our study considers a very specic setting, one needs to be careful
when drawing policy conclusions. While we have provided a behavioral existence proof
of crowding out through regulation and crowding in through deregulation, a number of
abstractions from natural labor markets (such as the restriction to monopsonistic buyers)
preclude drawing lessons on the e¤ects of minimum wages on naturally occurring labor mar-
kets. Specically, our result that the direct e¤ect of a binding minimum wages dominates
the indirect crowding e¤ect certainly depends on the specic conditions of the market and
on the level of the minimum wage. Moreover, we have by design excluded any possible im-
pact of minimum wages on employment levels as well as on the workersmotivation, which
would both be important determinants of the overall welfare e¤ects of minimum wages.
What our behavioral existence proof implies, however, is that crowding e¤ects should not
be ignored when devising new (de-)regulation schemes.
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Instructions (Treatment MWF), NOT FOR PUBLICATION 
 
Welcome to this experiment! You can earn money in this experiment, and the amount that 
you will receive at the end depends on the decisions you and the other participants make.  
 
Please read these instructions carefully. If there is anything you do not understand, please 
indicate this by raising your hand. We will answer your questions individually. The instruc-
tions are identical for all participants. 
 
The experiment consists of several periods. At the beginning of the experiment, each partici-
pant is randomly assigned a role that remains the same up to the end of the experiment. You 
know your own role but do not know the roles of other participants. Of course your anonym-
ity will be protected throughout the entire experiment. This means that the other participants 
will not be told your real identity. The same applies to all participants.  
 
The experiment deals with a situation in which there are firms, employees, and consumers. 
There are two firms, each of which has been assigned one employee who can manufacture a 
maximum of ten units of a specific product. How much the employee actually produces de-
pends on how many units the consumer wants to buy from the firm. The firm determines the 
wage that the employee earns per unit sold. An employee remains assigned to the same firm 
throughout the entire experiment. Both firms produce the same product, and both offer this 
product to the same consumer. The consumer can buy a maximum of ten units of the product, 
and can decide which firm to buy from and how many units to buy from each of them.  
 
At the beginning of the experiment, the five roles—two firms, two employees, and one con-
sumer—will be assigned to the five participants. Throughout the entire experiment, these as-
signed roles will remain the same. This means that the firms, the employees, and the con-
sumer that you are dealing with will remain the same in all rounds. 
 
The payment each participant receives is measured in points and depends on the participant’s 
role: 
- The employee receives the wage paid by the firm. It is a piece rate; that is, the em-
ployee receives a fixed amount set by the firm per unit sold. The wage must be at least 
three points per unit. The employee himself does not take any decisions. If the con-
sumer does not buy anything from the firm, the employee does not receive a wage, 
and thus receives a payment of zero. 
- The firm receives the unit price for the product, multiplied by the number of units 
bought by the consumer, minus what the firm pays the employee. If the consumer does 
not buy anything from the firm, the firm does not have to pay the employee, so in to-
tal, the firm receives zero. 
- The value the consumer places on one unit of the good is 25 points. He can buy a 
maximum of 10 units, but he can also buy less. This means that he receives 250 points 
minus the total price if he buys 10 units of the good. If he buys less than 10 units, he 
receives the number of units multiplied by 25, minus the sum of the prices that he has 
to pay for them. The consumer can distribute the purchase of units between the two 
firms as desired, and he is not forced to buy from either of the two firms. If a con-
sumer does not buy anything, he receives no payment in that period.  
 
 
The procedure of the experiment is as follows: 
 2
 
1. First, each of the two firms chooses the wage for the employee assigned to it and the 
price at which it wants to sell each unit of the product. The wage per unit must lie be-
tween 3 and 50 points, and the price per unit between 0 and 50 points. 
2. The consumer learns the price at which each of the firms is offering the good and what 
piece rate it pays its employee. On this basis, the consumer decides how many units he 
wants to buy from each firm. 
3. The purchases are made.  
4. The decisions and payments to all participants are displayed on the computer screen. 
 
This situation will be repeated 20 times. Then, after we have informed you about a change in 
the rules, another 20 periods will follow. In this second part of the experiment, the roles of all 
participants will remain the same as in the first, and the group will remain the same as well. 
 
Your final payment will amount to the sum of all payments in all periods. The exchange rate 
for the points that you can earn throughout the experiment is 200 points = 1 Euro. 
 
At the beginning, you will receive a fixed amount of 5 Euro. Any losses you make will be 
deducted from this amount. 
 
If there is anything you did not understand, please let us know by raising your hand. We will 
then answer your questions individually. 
 
 
